Abstract:

Traditionally most philosophers regard understanding as a form of explanation (Hempel, 1965; Khalifa, 2013; Strevens, 2013). They argue that explanation improves understanding and no understanding is without explanation. However, Peter Lipton challenges this conventional argument with cases for understanding without explanation (Lipton, 2008, p. 43). One of the most typical cases in his argument is how tacit knowledge operates in understanding. In this thesis, I argue for the view that there is understanding without explanation. I shall strengthen Lipton’s argument by three steps. Firstly, I will introduce and critically examine different accounts of explanation and understanding in the first three sections. Secondly, I will make a detailed analysis of Lipton’s argument for understanding without explanation and defend Lipton’s argument against Kareem Khalifa’s criticisms. Thirdly, I will explore deeper into the concept of tacit knowledge based on the debate between Michael Polanyi and Neil Gascoigne and Tim Thornton. Finally, I shall propose an account of tacit understanding as the representative case of understanding without explanation.